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Abstract 
 
Social media platforms are valuable tools for 
political campaigns. In this study, we analyze a dataset 
representing over 22 thousand Facebook posts by 
candidates and over 48 million comments to 
understand the nature of online discourse. Specifically, 
we study the interaction between political candidates 
and the public during the 2016 presidential elections in 
the United States. We outline a novel method to 
classify commentators into four groups: strong 
supporters, supporters, dissenters, and strong 
dissenters. Comments by each group on policy-related 
topics are analyzed using sentiment analysis. Finally, 
we discuss avenues for future research to study the 
dynamics of social media platforms and political   
campaigns. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Numerous studies show general citizens, voters and 
political representatives believe social media platforms 
to be legitimate spaces for active political participation 
[1]-[5]. Social media allows more people to participate 
in the political arena, involving more young people as 
well as those of different socio-economic statures [6]-
[10]. Particularly, those users who are members of 
political parties use social media to gather information 
from fellow party members and have political 
discussions [11]. Users with party affiliation view 
social media sites as valid means of political 
engagement, expressing and discussing political views, 
and are positive about the effectiveness of participation 
through social media [11]. Politicians also use social 
media as a form of legitimate political engagement, 
particularly to market themselves and discuss issues 
with voters [12]. 
Facebook has already established itself as an 
important medium for political communication. For 
example, by 2011 in Norway, the use of Facebook was 
commonplace for political engagement [12]. 
Politicians use Facebook to broaden constituent 
accessibility and voter mobilization [12]. President 
Obama had higher activity levels and was portrayed 
more positively in Facebook groups than his 
counterpart, John McCain, during the 2008 presidential 
election [13]. Part of the success of President Barack 
Obama’s campaign in the 2008 elections is thus 
credited to his campaign’s ability to leverage Social 
Networking Sites (SNSs) [13], [4]. 
Although SNSs such as Facebook have become 
prominent means of communication for political 
campaigns and potentially play a crucial role in 
election results [14],[15], personal opinions and 
sentiments expressed by the general public on these 
platforms are often understudied [16]. In fact, data 
from the public can provide novel insights into online 
campaigning [17]. It can even be a summarizing 
indicator that could be used to predict the outcome of 
elections. 
We studied the interaction between political 
candidates and the public during the 2016 presidential 
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election in the United States. We analyzed content 
from the Facebook pages of the following candidates:  
Donald J.  Trump, Hillary R. Clinton, Bernie Sanders, 
Ted Cruz, John R Kasich,  Martin J. O’Malley, Marco 
A. Rubio, Ben S. Carson, Jeb E. Bush,  Jim S. Gilmore, 
Chris J. Christie, Carly C. Fiorina, Rick J. Santorum, 
Rand H. Paul, and Mike D. Huckabee. We collected 
over 22 thousand Facebook posts, with over 48 million 
comments on those posts from the date the first 
candidate officially announced their intention to run for 
the U.S. presidency, (January 1st, 2015) until the time 
Donald J. Trump was assumed to be the winner of the 
2016 election (end of day, November 8
th
, 2016). To 
understand the dynamics of interactions between the 
candidates and public, we divided data into four 
periods: 1) all candidates, 2) a selected group of 
Republicans and two Democrats, 3) one Republican 
and two Democrats, and 4) one candidate from each 
party. In this study, due to space limitations, we will 
highlight the results from time period II (a selected 
group of Republicans and two Democrats). The official 
Facebook posts of the candidates were analyzed using 
topic modeling, which allows us to identify core policy 
topics that each candidate discussed on their Facebook 
page. We put forth a novel method to classify 
commentators into four distinct groups: Supporters: 
expressed moderate positive opinions on a candidate’s 
posts, Strong Supporters: expressed strong positive 
opinions, Dissenters: expressed moderate negative 
opinions, and Strong Dissenters: expressed strong 
negative opinions. We then study linguistic and 
psychological attributes of comments, to understand 
how different groups of commentators reacted to a 
given candidate’s posts. 
       The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section provides a literature review. Section 3 
describes our research methodology. The results and 
analysis of findings are presented in Section 4. Section 
5 concludes the paper and outlines opportunities for 
future research. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Extant literature acknowledges the importance of 
SNSs for political engagements [1]-[5]. According to 
Enli and Skogerbø [12], SNSs enable the 
personalization of politics by broadening how 
candidates and the public are able to connect in new 
and different ways, which create different forms of 
political engagement. 
Researchers are fascinated by the role that 
Facebook plays in political campaigns [4],[8],[18]. 
Williams and Gulati [19] suggests that Facebook is the 
leading platform for political campaigning. For 
example, in a study by Andersen and Medaglia [20], 
over half of respondents (57%) in Denmark used 
Facebook to communicate with the candidate with 
whom they were Facebook friends, compared to 6% 
and 7% via mail and other chat mediums like Skype 
and MSN, respectively. Facebook is an attractive 
platform for digital natives who are developing their 
civic engagement skills and allows them to practice 
participating where they may not have been as inclined 
to participate before [21]. Studies show that students 
who show more political/civic participation on 
Facebook have higher rates of participation in the 
offline world [11], [22]. Those who are politically 
active in real life are those who are most likely to be 
politically active on Facebook  [21].  
Facebook is considered an attractive SNS for 
political campaigning because of its distinctive 
features. Candidates utilize it to campaign, interact 
with supporters, and to mobilize networks to advance 
their candidacy [3]. For example, Facebook offers 
personalized participation elements of sharing and net- 
working with “friends”, which allows candidates to 
reach out to potential voters and connect with them 
[12], [18]. Politicians, in choosing “to be where their 
voters were,” consider Facebook the most important 
medium for political campaigns compared to other 
platforms such as Twitter [12]. On the general citizens 
and voters side, Facebook is unique as it offers features 
such as the “newsfeed” and “wall” which allow users’ 
thoughts   and opinions to be displayed for their 
networks and thus increases more participations [23]. 
The ability to “comment” and “like” on Facebook 
directly impacts opinion-sharing and political 
engagement. “Likes” imply visibility and approval, 
agreement, or endorsement of the post in question and 
its content [24]. The larger the numbers of “likes”, the 
more engagement Facebook users have with the post’s 
content [24]. Comments, on the other hand, are 
vocalizations of user opinion and beliefs [24]. 
Debating and interacting through commenting and 
sharing on Facebook posts has become more appealing 
to younger users than traditional, time-consuming 
political engagement activities like canvassing and 
fund-raising [21],[24]. 
Lane and Dal Cin [25] found that sharing online on 
Facebook walls leads to engaging in offline helping 
behaviors (e.g. volunteering for an issue-related cause). 
These findings appear to deny that “slacktivism”, or 
mere shallow gestures, is the result of political 
engagement online. Therefore, a person’s commitment 
on Facebook is a reflection of his/her overall level of 
engagement, not a more flippant attitude than usual 
towards politics invoked by the medium. Let us take an 
example of the “Friends” feature available on 
Facebook. On the surface, this feature could provide 
candidates with a way “connect” with voters, to reach 
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out to them, and to hopefully mobilize them. 
According to a survey conducted by Andersen and 
Medaglia [20], when people who were listed as friends 
of the two main candidates for Prime Minister of 
Denmark in the 2007 election were surveyed, the 
majority of respondents (56%) said they friended the 
candidate in order to become better educated about the 
candidate’s policy (45%) or be an “influence on their 
policy” (11%) versus the self-serving motives of 
“visibility on the Internet” (34%), and social prestige 
(19%). About one half of respondents were engaged 
online because they genuinely wanted to participate in 
the political process; therefore, one should take their 
behavior as indicative of their offline support or 
disapproval for a candidate. In this vein, Facebook 
appears to reproduce the traditional channels of 
supporting candidates, like party membership or 
connection to the campaign through employment or 
volunteering [20]. 
Although extant literature acknowledges the 
usefulness of Facebook’s features for political 
engagements, little is known about how political 
engagements between candidates and the public are 
established. Sweetser and Lariscy [18] conducted 
content analysis of Facebook wall comments in the 
U.S. House and Senate races during the 2006 midterm 
election. They found that individuals who wrote on 
candidate walls consider themselves on friendly terms 
with the candidates, writing messages that are light 
hearted, supportive, and positive in tone. Candidates 
however, rarely responded to these messages. 
Gustafsson [11] studies three distinct user types, 
members of political parties or candidates, members of 
interest organizations, and those not politically active 
(non-members). He also finds that users do not appear 
to change their established political participation 
behaviors when exposed to political content and calls 
for political action on social media. Those users who 
were politically active before remain politically active 
while non-member users continued not to share their 
political views on social media or become politically 
involved. Because non- members did not change their 
engagement in politics, those users who are 
commenting on candidates’ posts are invested in 
political engagement. Through their comments, they 
are showing support for the candidate they are reacting 
to, or are in support of another candidate and are 
attacking that candidate’s rivals. These users are 
already involved and already feel strongly; almost all 
expressed a desire to vote. 
The unique contribution of this paper can be found 
in 1) the study of interactions between political 
candidates and the public during the 2016 presidential 
election in the United States, 2) a novel method to 
classify commentators into four groups: strong 
supporters, supporters, dissenters, and strong 
dissenters and, 3) the analysis of linguistic and 
psychological attributes of these groups. Moreover, we 
hope to contribute   to knowledge on computational 
political science both with our findings as well as our 
methodological approach (e.g. the use of topic 
modeling, commentators’ classification, and the 
analysis of linguistic and psychological attributes). 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1. Dataset 
 
Our dataset is comprised of 22,233 posts, and 
48,991,502 comments spanning  the  entire  period  
from  when   the   first  candidate  announced their 
campaign  (Jan  1
st
,  2015)  until  the  time  Donald J. 
Trump was assumed to be the winner of the 2016 
election (end of day, November 8
th
, 2016).  We   
created     a python script that utilized Facebook’s 
official Graph API
1
 to collect posts and comments 
from every presidential candidate Facebook pages. We 
pre-processed our data by removing irrelevant posts 
and comments that were either not in English or did 
not have textual content. We also removed comments 
that were suspected to be from bots (i.e. VOTE FOR 
TRUMP, LET’S MAKE AMERICA GREAT 
AGAIN). 
To understand the dynamics of topics and people 
interactions, we defined four periods as follows: 
 
Table 1. Definition of Periods 
Period  Dates 
No. 
Posts 
No. 
Comments 
Candidates 
 
 
I 
 
01/01/2015 
To 
03/02/2016 
 
 
16,696 
 
 
14,732,578 
(R) - Bush; Carson; 
Christie; Cruz; 
Fiorina; Gilmore; 
Huckabee; Kasich; 
Paul; Rubio; 
Santorum; Trump 
(D) - Clinton; 
Sanders; O’Malley 
 
II 
03/03/2016 
To 
05/04/2016 
 
1,901 
 
5,233,383 
(R)  -  Cruz; Kasich; 
Rubio; 
Trump 
(D) - Clinton;  Sanders  
III 
05/05/2016 
To 
07/25/2016 
 
1,651 
 
6,034,076 
(R) – Trump 
(D) - Clinton; Sanders 
 
IV 
07/26/2016 
To 
11/08/2016 
 
1,985 
 
22,991,465 
(R) - Trump 
(D) - Clinton 
 
The first period includes all candidates who ran until 
the first vote (Iowa caucus)
2
. Subsequent periods were 
chosen to study how commentators changed their 
                                                 
1
 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api 
2
 http://raviudeshi.com/16/02/2016-election-calendar 
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behavior as candidates dropped out and the field 
thinned. 
 
3.2. Policy-related Topic Inference 
 
       Policy-related topics show political polarization 
among commentators. Thus, to discover the topics for 
each period, we utilized Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA) [26] on all candidates’ posts. LDA fits our task 
as it is unsupervised probabilistic topic inference 
model that does not require a labeled dataset. This 
model assumes each document (post in this case) is a 
mixture of K latent topics, and each topic is a 
probability distribution over words. Therefore, a topic 
is the clustering of co-occurred words together. We 
manually examined the resultant topics, removed 
irrelevant topics, (such as those that call for attending 
events/debates) and then selected policy related topics. 
Next, the selected topics are labeled with their 
appropriate label (Healthcare, Taxes, etc.).  Figure 1 
shows an example of a post by Clinton on a policy-
related topic (Climate Change) and below the post are 
examples of positive and negative comments identified 
by the algorithm, (pictures and names of commentators 
are covered). Next, for each candidate C and each 
period P, we select the top T topics that the candidate 
is actively posting, where the majority of the 
candidate’s posts (more than 70%) are discussing these 
topics. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a Post and its Comments 
 
3.3. Identifying Four Categories of 
Commentators 
 
        Once we identified the topics and assigned 
candidates’ posts to one of the topics, we examined the 
comments from commentators to identify: strong 
supporters, supporters, dissenters, and strong dissenters 
for a candidate. We measured both positive and 
negative sentiment scores for each comment using the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) tool [27] 
where each score is measured from 0 to 100, the latter 
being the highest. For each candidate and each period, 
we measured the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) 
for positive µpos, σpos and negative µneg , σneg scores of 
the comments. Then we adjusted them based on the 
weight (W) of top topics the candidate discussed. For 
example, if Clinton mainly focuses on three topics 
during period 1 with 80% of her posts about these 
topics, then we multiply the mean (µ) and standard 
deviation (σ) by 0.8 to get a weighted mean and 
weighted standard deviation. Using the three-sigma 
rule [28], we defined the following categories of 
commentators who commented solely on one 
candidate: 
 
 Supporters: a commentator (s)  whose  comments  
on  a candidate (c) during a period (p) satisfies the 
following: 
 
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠)
 > 
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠)
 
 
AND 
 
 µpos × W ≤  
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠)
   ≤ σ pos × W 
 
 Strong Supporters: a commentator (ss) whose 
comments on a candidate (c) during a period (p) 
satisfies the following: 
 
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑠)
 > 
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑠)
 
 
AND 
 
 
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑠)
   > σ pos × W 
 
 Dissenters: a commentator  (d) whose  comments  
on   a candidate (c) during a period (p) satisfies the 
following: 
 
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑑)
 > 
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑑)
 
 
AND 
 
 µneg × W ≤  
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑑)
   ≤ σ neg × W 
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 Strong Dissenters: a commentator (sd) whose 
comments on a candidate (c) during a period (p) 
satisfies the following: 
 
 
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑑)
 > 
∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑑)
 
 
AND 
 
 
∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑑
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝑠𝑑)
   > σ neg × W 
 
       In other words, if a commentator commented 
mostly positively on a candidate and his/her averaged 
positive score is between the mean and one standard 
deviation for all commentators’ scores on that 
candidate, then he/she will be classified as supporter. If 
his/her score is above one standard deviation, then 
he/she is strong supporter. Similarly, the same rules 
applied on dissenters and strong dissenters but with 
negative scores. Figure 2 presents the flow chart of 
classifying a commentator. 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow Chart of Classifying a 
Commentator 
 
3.4. Linguistic and Psychological Indices 
 
       We utilized the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC) tool [27] to infer the linguistic and 
psychological indices of commentators based on their 
comments to a candidate’s posts. The algorithm 
processes each comment to search for and count words 
in psychology-relevant categories by comparing them 
with a dictionary file. Then, it assigns relevant words 
to one of the indices. Next, the indices are scored 0 to 
100 based on the percentage of all words in the   
document. 
      The Analytical Thinking index examines how 
formal, logical, and hierarchical the writing is. This 
index is important   in revealing how well-educated a 
person is [29]. The Clout index suggests that the 
commentator is writing from the perspective of high 
expertise and is confident [30]. The Authenticity index 
measures how authentic and honest the writing is; 
higher scores suggest honest writing and lower scores 
suggest deceptive writing [31]. Anger, Anxiety, and 
Sadness measure the tone expressed in writing [32]. 
The indices are scored based on their occurrences 
within the   corpus. 
 
4. Results and Findings  
 
In this paper, due to space limitations, we will 
present the results of period II only. Results for other 
time periods can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
 
4.1. Resultant Policy Related Topics 
 
We utilized Gensim Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA) [33] to infer latent topics from the candidate 
posts. For each period, we ran the LDA algorithm 
iteratively on the posts to infer 10 topics. During each 
run of the algorithm we removed stop words (e.g. the, 
vote, candidates’ names, states). Each topic consisted 
of 10 keywords. For example, the immigration topic 
was made up of the following keywords (illegal, 
immigration, border, build wall, immigrants) and 
Jobs/Taxes topic was made up the following keywords 
(Jobs, workers, working class, taxes, tax plan, 
millions). Next, we manually labeled topics with their 
appropriate label (e.g. taxes, healthcare, etc.) and 
removed irrelevant topics that are not related to public 
policies (e.g. campaigning, events). Table 2 (next page) 
shows the top topics for each candidate in period II. 
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Table 2. Top Topics of Candidates 
Topic  Cruz Kasich Rubio Trump Clinton Sanders 
I Jobs, Taxes 
Wall Street, 
Climate Change 
Immigration 
Healthcare, 
Women Rights 
Jobs, Taxes 
Wall Street, 
Climate Change 
II Immigratio
n 
Immigration Terrorism/Security Terrorism/Security Immigration Jobs, Taxes 
III - Jobs, Taxes - 
Wall Street, 
Climate Change 
Healthcare, 
Women Rights 
Healthcare, 
Women Rights 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Comments and Commentators by   Candidate 
Category Unit Cruz Kasich Rubio Trum
p 
Clinton Sanders 
Strong Supporters 
Comments 2180 237 49 5290 168 360 
Commentators 2030 230 49 4481 154 345 
Supporters 
Comments 2002 553 114 9166 282 119 
Commentators 1808 520 114 7780 259 118 
Dissenters 
Comments 4676 174 79 8041 49 702 
Commentators 4112 169 79 7212 49 686 
Strong Dissenters 
Comments 4283 150 56 5700 130 449 
Commentators 3653 143 56 4754 115 446 
 
Table 4. Ratio of Comments/Commentators by   Candidate 
Category Unit Cruz Kasich Rubio Trum
p 
Clinton Sanders 
 
Supporters/Strong Supporters 
Comments 13141 1114 298 28197 629 1630 
Commentators 11603 1062 298 24227 577 1595 
Ratio 1.09 1.05 1.00 1.18 1.09 1.03 
 
Dissenters/Strong Dissenters 
Comments 8959 324 135 13741 179 1151 
Commentators 7765 312 135 11966 164 1132 
Ratio 1.15 1.04 1.00 1.14 1.09 1.02 
 
4.2. Distribution of Comments and Commentators 
by Candidate 
 
         Table 3 shows distribution of commentators and 
their comments by candidate in period II. All 
candidates (except Cruz and Sanders) had more 
comments and commentators in the supporters and 
strong supporters categories compared to the ones in 
the dissenters and strong dissenters categories. For 
Cruz and Sanders, the opposite is true where they had 
larger number of dissenters and strong dissenters (with 
their comments) compared to the number of their 
supporters/strong supporters. Trump had the largest 
total number of comments and commentators while 
Rubio had the least. Clinton and Sanders had similar 
numbers of comments and commentators in supporters 
and strong supporters group. However, Clinton, 
compared to Sanders, had a much smaller number of 
comments and commentators in dissenters and strong 
dissenters categories. Both Trump and Cruz had a large 
number of comments and commentators across the 
different groups; however, unlike Trump, Cruz had a 
large number of comments and commentators in 
dissenters/strong dissenters. 
Table 4 shows the ratio of comments/commentators 
for supporters/strong supporters and dissenters/strong 
dissenters. In this table, Trump is the leading 
Republican candidate with a score of 1.18 and Clinton 
is leading Democrat candidate with a score of 1.09. 
This ratio might be a plausible indicator of electoral 
success and can comes close to traditional polls. This is 
in line with findings reported by Véronis [34] and 
Tumasjan et al. [35]. Véronis [34] studied the 2007 
French elections on Twitter, and he observed that 
counting candidate’s mentions can be a better predictor 
of electoral success than traditional polls. Similarly, 
Tumasjan   et al. [35] analyzed tweets related to the 
2009 German federal election and found that the mere 
number of tweets mentioning a political party reflects 
voter preferences. For Cruz, the ratio is higher in 
dissenters and strong dissenters than the ratio in 
supporters and strong supporters. All other candidates 
have either an equal ratio or a lower   ratio. 
 
4.3. Analysis of Indices 
 
4.3.1. Analytical Thinking Index. (Table 5): Strong 
supporters always score the highest across all 
candidates. Strong supporters of Clinton scored higher 
than those of Trump. The score is relatively low for all 
candidates in dissenter and strong dissenter groups. 
 
4.3.2. Authenticity Index. (Table 6): Authentic 
comments might be more understandable compared to 
deceptive comments, which are hinged on imagination 
[36]. They differ from each other based on the level of  
detail, where authentic comments are typically more 
detailed than deceptive ones [37]. The scores for 
dissenters and strong dissenters are high across all 
candidates. This indicates that honest writing is more 
likely to be shown in the comments written by 
dissenters or strong dissenters. Comments written by Page 1776
Table 5. Analytical Thinking Scores 
Category Cruz Kasich Rubio Trum
p 
Clinton Sanders 
Strong Supporters 72.32 66.91 85.27 89.26 92.84 89.18 
Supporters 53.03 53.70 54.02 57.98 56.03 44.03 
Dissenters 64.82 59.66 45.11 54.30 52.20 51.95 
Strong Dissenters 54.65 58.25 46.78 65.56 61.30 55.83 
 
Table 6. Authenticity Scores 
Category Cruz Kasich Rubio Trump Clinton Sanders 
Strong Supporters 10.94 11.23 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.91 
Supporters 21.45 31.03 11.13 11.09 8.96 14.44 
Dissenters 20.34 24.84 42.94 24.86 16.37 33.36 
Strong Dissenters 26.80 38.04 38.60 20.05 17.23 24.11 
 
Table 7. Clout Scores 
Category Cruz Kasich Rubio Trum
p 
Clinton Sanders 
Strong Supporters 55.85 60.72 55.80 51.92 51.55 55.21 
Supporters 67.87 70.00 72.90 68.41 64.24 67.00 
Dissenters 69.65 69.37 67.30 64.33 77.09 57.23 
Strong Dissenters 62.60 66.15 57.93 50.47 60.27 45.93 
 
supporters and strong supporters may be deceptive or 
may not include details. A possible explanation being 
that the supporters and strong supporters already have 
a bias to supporting their candidate which comes 
across in their writing as deceptive’ or at least not 
being authentic or credible due to lack of enough 
detail and evidence [18]. 
 
4.3.3. Clout Index. (Table 7): In contrast to Cruz and 
Clinton supporters, the supporters of the other 
candidates are confident. Confidence is greater 
among dissenters and strong dissenters for Clinton. 
Given the nature of the 2016 election campaign, and 
the rift between the supporters of the two democrat 
candidates, this result is interesting and points to the 
fact that Clinton’s dissenters, and strong dissenters, 
were more confident in their remarks. 
 
4.3.4. Indices of Top Topics. We further deepened 
our analysis to see the trends of indices over top 
topics per a candidate. Due to space limitations, we 
are showing only the tables for Trump and Clinton. 
For Trump, the highest scores for Analytical 
Thinking are typically in the Strong Supporters 
category (across all the top topics) (Table 8). For 
Authenticity and Clout, the Dissenters and Strong 
Dissenters score higher compared to his fans, where 
the highest scores are from Dissenters on Topic 1. 
Table 9 presents the scores of indices of the four 
categories for Clinton’s top topics. Her supporters 
score the highest on Analytical Thinking. The 
Dissenters and Strong Dissenters score higher scores 
on Authenticity and Clout, with Topic II receiving 
the highest scores. 
Table 8. Linguistic Indices for Trump’s Top    
Topics 
Category Index Topic I Topic II Topic III 
 
Strong Supporters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
89.51 89.24 88.54 
Authenticity 2.73 3.18 1.80 
Clout 52.86 51.82 52.15 
 
Supporters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
60.32 60.30 56.42 
Authenticity 9.35 11.04 10.55 
Clout 62.06 69.04 67.64 
 
Dissenters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
55.63 55.20 54.10 
Authenticity 26.48 23.55 25.33 
Clout 64.99 63.40 63.64 
 
Strong Dissenters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
64.78 66.92 65.64 
Authenticity 21.61 19.57 20.08 
Clout 50.47 50.24 50.38 
 
Next, we analyzed the topics that supporters 
supported the most and topics that brought most 
anger, anxiety, and sadness from dissenters. Table 10 
(next page) shows positive sentiment of supporting 
groups and the negative emotions (Anger, Anxiety, 
Sadness) of dissenters on top topics for Trump (we 
omitted positive sentiment for the dissenters because 
these   are typically zeros or negligible scores, similar 
applies to negative emotions scores for the supporting 
group). In this table, Trump’s supporters supported 
him mostly on his Wall Street and climate change 
policies (Topic III). His opponents (strong dissenters) 
expressed the most anger on his healthcare and 
women rights policies, and anxious and sad on Wall 
Street and climate change policies. 
 
Page 1777
  
 
Table 9. Linguistic Indices for Clinton’s Top    
Topics 
Category Index Topic I Topic II Topic 
III  
Strong Supporters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
94.91 90.89 92.74 
Authenticity 2.73 3.18 1.80 
Clout 52.86 51.82 52.15 
 
Supporters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
56.67 48.49 58.54 
Authenticity 12.41 9.95 6.79 
Clout 55.99 62.61 69.37 
 
Dissenters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
46.08 55.13 46.84 
Authenticity 4.23 31.45 13.81 
Clout 77.32 86.69 65.15 
 
Strong Dissenters 
Analytical 
Thinking 
59.31 58.30 64.04 
Authenticity 19.71 20.97 14.32 
Clout 70.47 48.02 58.41 
 
Table 10. Sentiment Indices for Trump’s Top    
Topics 
Category Index Topic I Topic II Topic III 
Strong Supporters Positive 
Sentiment 
94.69 94.68 95.33 
Supporters Positive 
Sentiment 
48.04 47.90 47.84 
 
Dissenters 
Anger 6.70 6.63 6.65 
Anxiety 1.22 1.35 1.82 
Clout 2.44 2.87 2.90 
 
Strong Dissenters 
Anger 22.64 20.21 19.05 
Anxiety 1.75 1.63 2.08 
Clout 6.18 8.66 11.60 
 
Table 11 presents positive sentiment of 
supporting groups and the negative emotions (Anger, 
Anxiety, Sadness) of dissenters on top topics for 
Clinton (again we omitted negligible scores). 
Clinton’s supporters supported her mostly on her jobs 
and taxes policy. Her dissenters expressed anger and 
anxious sentiment over her immigration policy. They 
expressed the most sadness on her healthcare and 
women rights   policies. 
 
Table 11. Sentiment Indices for Clinton’s Top    
Topics 
Category Index Topic I Topic II Topic III 
Strong Supporters Positive 
Sentiment 
99.69 98.68 99.23 
Supporters Positive 
Sentiment 
51.57 54.68 51.27 
 
Dissenters 
Anger 3.86 4.06 5.99 
Anxiety 0.46 0.5 1.67 
Clout 1.06 1.99 1.79 
 
Strong Dissenters 
Anger 8.23 16.07 12.03 
Anxiety 1.34 2.47 1.61 
Clout 2.78 1.98 8.46 
 
5. Conclusion and Areas for Future 
Research 
 
In this paper, we identified the characteristics of 
people who interacted with candidates during the 
2016 U.S. elections on Facebook. First, we identified 
policy related topics that bring political polarization 
within candidates’ posts using topic modeling. 
Second, we proposed a novel approach to classifying 
participants based on the positive and negative 
sentiments expressed in their comments. In addition, 
we also presented the analysis of different linguistic 
and psychological indices and how they differ across 
groups. 
Our future research areas include: 1) 
understanding the contagion effect on the interactions 
between posts and comments, 2) building predictive 
models that link online and offline political activities, 
3) connecting Facebook data with activity on other 
social media platforms, such as Twitter, and 4) 
studying the dynamics of networks of commentators 
in relation to policy topics and candidates they 
support. 
Studying how a post by a candidate, especially 
the tone expressed in it (positive or negative) impacts 
the responses of the various groups of commentators 
will help us understand how sentiments spread 
around individuals (candidates) and the topics (policy 
viewpoints and/or priorities). Another area of future 
research is developing predictive models that link 
online and offline political engagements. 
Past research shows mixed findings for 
predictability between online and offline behavior. 
There are studies that found that offline behavior and 
online behavior are consistent and each can be an 
indicator for political behavior of the other [25], [11], 
[38]; others found the opposite [39]. We are in the 
process of looking at critical incidents that took place 
offline during the election and linking them with 
online activities, i.e. particular posts or unusual 
activity with comments. The goal being to see if we 
can train machine learning models to alert us when 
online activities cross given thresholds which might 
indicate potential type of offline activity (e.g. rallies, 
change in key messages in an upcoming speech,   
etc.). 
Fusing Facebook data with activities on other 
social media (e.g. Twitter) platforms opens up 
interesting opportunities for new research. Past 
research has also found strong use of Twitter in 
political campaigns and, in the U.S.; this effect was 
strengthened by President Trump’s use. Véronis [34] 
studied the 2007 French elections on Twitter and he 
observed that counting candidate’s mentions can be a 
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better predictor of electoral success than traditional 
polls. Similarly, Tumasjan et al. [35] analyzed tweets 
related to the 2009 German federal election and 
found that the mere number of tweets mentioning a 
political party reflects voter preferences. Standberg 
[40] analyzed both Twitter and Facebook to 
understand the use of social media in the 2011 
Finland election cycle.  The study concluded that 
differences in social media had much     to do with 
demographic characteristics such as age, income, 
gender, education, and Internet use. We plan to link 
our Facebook data with Twitter data around key 
events (e.g. during debates, campaign rallies, etc.), 
albeit in shorter timeframes (+/- 1 day). Linking data 
will allow us to see how online conversations on 
Twitter and posts by candidates reflect on Facebook 
immediately and drive future conversations in terms 
of comment. 
Lastly, we have network level data linking 
commentators with candidates and the various policy 
topics. We intend to study the evolution of networks 
across the four time periods. Specifically, we are 
interested in looking at how network typologies 
change as candidates drop out and as the prominence 
of policy topics change over time. 
 
6. References  
 
[1] Rainie, Lee, et al. "Social media and political 
engagement." Pew Internet & American Life Project 19 
(2012). 
 
[2] Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastián 
Valenzuela. "Social media use for news and individuals' 
social capital, civic engagement and political participation." 
Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication 17.3 
(2012): 319-336. 
 
[3] Robertson, Scott P., Ravi K. Vatrapu, and Richard 
Medina. "Online video “friends” social networking: 
Overlapping online public spheres in the 2008 US 
presidential election." Journal of Information Technology 
& Politics 7.2-3 (2010): 182-201. 
 
[4] Cogburn, Derrick L., and Fatima K. Espinoza-Vasquez. 
"From networked nominee to networked nation: Examining 
the impact of Web 2.0 and social media on political 
participation and civic engagement in the 2008 Obama 
campaign." Journal of Political Marketing 10.1-2 (2011): 
189-213. 
 
[5] Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Logan Molyneux, and Pei 
Zheng. "Social media, political expression, and political 
participation: Panel analysis of lagged and concurrent 
relationships." Journal of Communication 64.4 (2014): 
612-634. 
 
[6] Pasek, Josh, Eian More, and Daniel Romer. "Realizing 
the social Internet? Online social networking meets offline 
civic engagement." Journal of Information Technology & 
Politics 6.3-4 (2009): 197-215. 
 
[7] Valenzuela, Sebastián, Namsu Park, and Kerk F. Kee. 
"Is there social capital in a social network site?: Facebook 
use and college students' life satisfaction, trust, and 
participation." Journal of Computer‐Mediated 
Communication 14.4 (2009): 875-901. 
 
[8] Kushin, Matthew James, and Masahiro Yamamoto. 
"Did social media really matter? College students' use of 
online media and political decision making in the 2008 
election." Mass Communication and Society 13.5 (2010): 
608-630. 
 
[9] Xenos, Michael, Ariadne Vromen, and Brian D. Loader. 
"The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and 
youth political engagement in three advanced 
democracies." Information, Communication & Society 17.2 
(2014): 151-167. 
 
[10] Loader, Brian D., Ariadne Vromen, and Michael A. 
Xenos. "The networked young citizen: social media, 
political participation and civic engagement." (2014): 143-
150. 
 
[11] Gustafsson, Nils. "The subtle nature of Facebook 
politics: Swedish social network site users and political 
participation." New Media & Society 14.7 (2012): 1111-
1127. 
 
[12] Enli, Gunn Sara, and Eli Skogerbø. "Personalized 
campaigns in party-centred politics: Twitter and Facebook 
as arenas for political communication." Information, 
Communication & Society 16.5 (2013): 757-774. 
 
[13] Woolley, Julia K., Anthony M. Limperos, and Mary 
Beth Oliver. "The 2008 presidential election, 2.0: A content 
analysis of user-generated political Facebook 
groups." Mass Communication and Society 13.5 (2010): 
631-652. 
 
[14] Fernandes, Juliana, et al. "The writing on the wall: A 
content analysis of college students' Facebook groups for 
the 2008 presidential election." Mass Communication and 
Society 13.5 (2010): 653-675. 
 
[15] Gibson, Rachel K., and Ian McAllister. "Do online 
election campaigns win votes? The 2007 Australian 
“YouTube” election." Political Communication28.2 
(2011): 227-244. 
 
[16] de Boer, Noortje, Hannah Sütfeld, and Jacob Groshek. 
"Social media and personal attacks: A comparative 
perspective on co-creation and political advertising in 
presidential campaigns on YouTube." First Monday 17.12 
(2012). 
 
Page 1779
  
[17] Groshek, Jacob, and Ahmed Al-Rawi. "Public 
sentiment and critical framing in social media content 
during the 2012 US presidential campaign." Social Science 
Computer Review 31.5 (2013): 563-576. 
 
[18] Sweetser, Kaye D., and Ruthann Weaver Lariscy. 
"Candidates make good friends: An analysis of candidates' 
uses of Facebook." International Journal of Strategic 
Communication 2.3 (2008): 175-198. 
 
[19] Williams, Christine B., and Girsh J. Gulati. "Facebook 
grows up: An empirical assessment of its role in the 2008 
congressional elections." Proceedings from Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago 32 (2009): 53. 
 
[20] Andersen, Kim Normann, and Rony Medaglia. "The 
use of Facebook in national election campaigns: politics as 
usual?." International Conference on Electronic 
Participation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. 
 
[21] Vitak, Jessica, et al. "It's complicated: Facebook users' 
political participation in the 2008 
election." CyberPsychology, behavior, and social 
networking 14.3 (2011): 107-114. 
 
[22] Vesnic-Alujevic, Lucia. "Political participation and 
web 2.0 in Europe: A case study of Facebook." Public 
Relations Review 38.3 (2012): 466-470. 
 
[23] Carlisle, Juliet E., and Robert C. Patton. "Is social 
media changing how we understand political engagement? 
An analysis of Facebook and the 2008 presidential 
election." Political Research Quarterly 66.4 (2013): 883-
895. 
 
[24] Gerodimos, Roman, and Jákup Justinussen. "Obama’s 
2012 Facebook campaign: Political communication in the 
age of the like button." Journal of Information Technology 
& Politics 12.2 (2015): 113-132. 
 
[25] Lane, Daniel S., and Sonya Dal Cin. "Sharing beyond 
Slacktivism: the effect of socially observable prosocial 
media sharing on subsequent offline helping 
behavior." Information, Communication & Society (2017): 
1-18. 
 
[26] Blei, David M., Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan. 
"Latent dirichlet allocation." Journal of machine Learning 
research 3.Jan (2003): 993-1022.     
 
[27] Tausczik, Yla R., and James W. Pennebaker. "The 
psychological meaning of words: LIWC and computerized 
text analysis methods." Journal of language and social 
psychology 29.1 (2010): 24-54. 
 
[28] Pukelsheim, Friedrich. "The three sigma rule." The 
American Statistician 48.2 (1994): 88-91. 
 
[29] Pennebaker, James W., et al. "When small words 
foretell academic success: The case of college admissions 
essays." PloS one 9.12 (2014): e115844. 
[30] Kacewicz, Ewa, et al. "Pronoun use reflects standings 
in social hierarchies." Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology 33.2 (2014): 125-143. 
 
[31] Newman, Matthew L., et al. "Lying words: Predicting 
deception from linguistic styles." Personality and social 
psychology bulletin 29.5 (2003): 665-675. 
 
[32] Cohn, Michael A., Matthias R. Mehl, and James W. 
Pennebaker. "Linguistic markers of psychological change 
surrounding September 11, 2001." Psychological 
science 15.10 (2004): 687-693. 
 
[33] Rehurek, Radim, and Petr Sojka. "Software framework 
for topic modelling with large corpora." In Proceedings of 
the LREC 2010 Workshop on New Challenges for NLP 
Frameworks. 2010. 
 
[34] Véronis, Jean. "Citations dans la presse et résultats du 
premier tour de la présidentielle 2007." Retrieved 
December 15 (2007): 2009. 
 
[35] Tumasjan, Andranik, et al. "Predicting elections with 
twitter: What 140 characters reveal about political 
sentiment." Icwsm 10.1 (2010): 178-185. 
 
[36] Yoo, Kyung-Hyan, and Ulrike Gretzel. "Comparison 
of deceptive and truthful travel reviews." Information and 
communication technologies in tourism 2009(2009): 37-47. 
 
[37] Hancock, Jeffrey T., et al. "On lying and being lied to: 
A linguistic analysis of deception in computer-mediated 
communication." Discourse Processes 45.1 (2007): 1-23. 
 
[38] Tufekci, Zeynep, and Christopher Wilson. "Social 
media and the decision to participate in political protest: 
Observations from Tahrir Square." Journal of 
Communication 62.2 (2012): 363-379. 
 
[39] Theocharis, Yannis, and Will Lowe. "Does Facebook 
increase political participation? Evidence from a field 
experiment." Information, Communication & Society 19.10 
(2016): 1465-1486. 
 
[40] Strandberg, Kim. "A social media revolution or just a 
case of history repeating itself? The use of social media in 
the 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections." New Media & 
Society 15.8 (2013): 1329-1347. 
Page 1780
